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BOOK REVIEW

By Morton E.
Winston. Wadsworth Publishing Co. 1988. Pp. 293
Softcover. $22.50.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS,

Reviewed by Dinah Shelton*
In the past fifty years, human rights have become a matter of
international concern, the subject of regional and global treaties and
declarations. Within the United States, the Bill of Rights and State
Constitutions have lengthened the list of recognized legal rights to
include the right to privacy and, in some cases, the right to education
or right to environment. In addition, greater attention is being sought
by and afforded disadvantaged groups and individuals. Each week
sees debate over new claims for inclusion in the catalogue of human
rights: The right to development, the right to a clean and safe environment, the right to tourism, the right to birth, the right to death.
At the same time, the very existence of "human" rights is under
question from those who would extend fundamental legal protections
to animals or all "biotes." In addition, attacks on long-recognized
human rights and efforts to secure their enforcement are being initiated at the United Nations in the name of cultural diversity, in regional meetings leading up to a global human rights conference
scheduled for June 1993. More than ever, the questions of what,
how and why human rights exist need to be posed and carefully
considered.
Study of philosophy or jurisprudence is not fashionable in legal
education. Yet very practical decisions turn upon the perceived philosophical foundations of human rights, including such basic issues as
whether or not economic rights constitute human rights and whether
humans have a particularity that results in all and only humans having rights. The meaning afforded the term rights may itself determine the length or the scope of the rights' catalogue. Legislators and
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negotiators struggling to decide whether to adopt a right to environment or whether to permit physician-assisted suicide should give
careful consideration to the foundations and theoretical framework
on which they base their decisions.
Morton Winston's anthology The Philosophy of Human Rights
is an outstanding collection of modern writings that provide anyone
interested in human rights, civil liberties, or legislation, with the basic materials to formulate, test, and reformulate their views on the
nature of rights and the justification for human rights. In four parts,
the book addresses the nature of rights, the content of human rights,
the justification for rights, and the nature of rights-holders. It also
has an appendix containing the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the two United Nations Human Rights Covenants. The
fact that there are two separate Covenants, one on civil and political
and the other on economic, social and cultural rights, itself reflects
the divergence of views on what constitutes human rights.
Winston's introductory essay sets the various chapters in an historical context and provides an excellent overview of the materials in
the book. He poses the questions that each of the authors and all
those who work on this subject attempt to answer: What are rights,
how do they differ from goals, duties, interests, needs and claims?
What are the specific rights mentioned in national and international
instruments; do they all have equal stature? Are there correlative
duties? Must rights be judicially enforceable to be rights? Are there
any absolute rights? Are human rights a projection of western philsophical and political traditions? What is the justification for the existence of human rights?
Winston defines human rights as universal moral rights that belong equally to all human beings by virtue of the fact that they are
human beings. Other authors in the first section of the book attempt
to frame general definitions of rights. Joseph Raz posits that "X has
a right if and only if X can have rights, and other things being
equal, an aspect of X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason
for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty." Raz distinguishes between core and derivative rights and finds that X can have
rights if X has ultimate or intrinsic, rather than instrumental value.
Joel Feinberg argues that "[t]o have a right is to have a claim to
something and against someone, the recognition of which is called for
by legal rules or, in the case of moral rights, by the principles of an
enlightened conscience." In contrast, Rex Martin states that a
human right is defective as a right in the absence of appropriate
practices of recognition and maintenance. Winston summarizes the
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views of the authors of the first section and finds that they suggest a
developmental pattern in the evolution of rights: from "manifesto"
rights when a need or good is recognized as requiring special social
protection and such protection is claimed as a moral entitlement, to
wider social recognition and acceptance through political or social
movements. Finally, the right in question is formally recognized in
civil or international law, with appropriate procedures for the protection and recognition of the right. In Martin's view, only at this
last stage can one speak of a human right. Another author, Carl
Wellman, analyzes human rights as clusters of ethical advantages,
building upon Hohfeld's elements of claim, liberty, power, or immunity. The final selection in the first chapter comes from Ronald
Dworkin's book, Taking Rights Seriously, and sets forth his wellknown analogy of rights as legal trumps in balancing social interests.
Part II, addressing the content of human rights, contains three
essays on the universality and customary catalogues of human rights.
Winston's introductory essay provides additional background and
material for discussion, especially on the question of adding new
rights to the existing catalogues.
The third part contains other well-known pieces, including
Henry Shue's excellent essay on the foundations of human rights in
human needs for security and for subsistence. It also prints Alasdair
MacIntyre's skeptical selection which concludes that "there are not
human rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and
unicorns." In his view, human rights are useful for political polemics
and protests, as records of considered moral judgments, values and
preferences, but they are not demonstrable moral truths. Alan
Gewirth provides the counterpoint to MacIntyre's essay. Gewirth
believes that a rational justification for the existence of human rights
derives from fundamental facts about human agency. The final piece
in the section, by David Lyons, attempts to demonstrate that belief
in human rights is compatible with utilitarian approaches to the general welfare. Interestingly, Shue, Lyon, and Gewirth all converge in
the belief that there are basic human rights, although their approaches differ. MacIntyre dissents.
The final section of the book poses perhaps the most perplexing
problem: Why do human beings have human rights? In some respects, the earlier essays also grapple with this question. Gewirth
believes that human rights are grounded on the universal capacity
for rational, purposeful agency. Claims that other species have similar abilities leads the various authors to take different approaches;
for the reader, one of the many provocative discussions that can re-
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suit from reading the book involves posing the question what does it
mean to be human?
The fact that Winston's small anthology provokes many
profound questions is a testament to its value. It is one of the rare
academic books that one is tempted to push on everyone and urge
them to read in order to have long discussions about its many ideas.
Winston has done a great service to human rights and to thinking.

